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The paper proposes a general model that will encompass trade and social benefits of a common 
language, a preference for a variety of languages, the fundamental role of translators, an emo-
tional attachment to maternal language, and the threat that globalization poses to the vast ma-
jority of languages. With respect to people’s emotional attachment, the model considers minor-
ities to suffer losses from the subordinate status of their language.  In addition, the model treats 
the threat to minority language as coming from the failure of the parents in the minority to 
transmit their maternal language (durably) to their children. Some familiar results occur. In 
particular, we encounter the usual social inefficiencies of decentralized solutions to language 
learning when the sole benefits of the learning are communicative benefits (though translation 
intervenes). However, these social inefficiencies assume a totally different air when the con-
sumer gains of variety are brought in. One fundamental aim of the paper is to bring together 
contributions to the economics of language from labor economics, network externalities and 
international trade that are typically treated separately.  
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A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING LANGUAGE 
AND WELFARE 
Jacques Mélitz* 
 The subject of language arises prominently in a variety of contexts in economics, for 
example, the determination of wages, network externalities, and foreign trade (for an over-
view, see Grin (1996) and Ginsburgh and Weber (2011)). Yet despite a considerable literature 
on the subject, it has not yet entered the mainstream of economics. Perhaps the reason lies in 
the absence of a general framework. Such a framework, I propose, must meet four criteria. 
First, it must accommodate the fact that political and market integration along with trade tend 
to diminish the number of languages in the world. Second, it must allow for the role of bilin-
gualism and translation in tying the world’s languages together. Third, it must admit diversity 
of languages as a benefit. Fourth, it must reflect the emotional attachment that people have to 
their native language. I will discuss the four criteria, and then try to sketch out an appropriate 
model.  
Ethnologue records nearly 7,000 living languages in the world (some 450 of which are 
“nearly extinct”). Living languages evolve and mix, new languages are forever in the making, 
and the right count is an issue.  But specialists agree that we are now in a phase of contraction 
(For prominent examples, see Krauss (1992), Dalby (2002), Lewis and Simons (2008) and 
Hagège (2011)). Of the roughly half in the Ethnologue listing with 10,000 or fewer speakers, 
only a small fraction can be expected to survive another century. Languages disappear remark-
ably fast, both, with the advance of trade and markets, and with regional political and econom-
ic integration within countries. Even among the 1,300 or so world languages that are still spo-
ken by over 100,000 people, attrition is easy to imagine over the 21st century.1 In addition, 
interpreters and translation enter in worldwide communication. To ignore this point necessarily 
                                               
* I have benefited a great deal from comments by Victor Ginsburgh. 
1 “Remember, though, the case of Breton, with perhaps a million speakers in living memory but now with very 
few children speakers, or Navajo, with well over 100,000 speakers a generation ago but now also with an un-
certain future” (Krauss (1992), p. 7). The normative implications are a separate issue. For a nuanced view of 
these implications, see Kibbee (2003).  
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exaggerates the required bilingualism for messages to get across. In theory, a trivial fraction of 
world population could carry messages to virtually all people on earth. Along with numerous 
languages, there is also a “world language system” with “central languages” tying all languages 
together (see De Swann (2001) and Heilbron (1999)). Some approaches to multiple languages 
by economists evidently help to understand these facts. If communicating parties benefit from a 
common language, the globalization of commerce is likely to encourage concentration of learn-
ing of second languages on a limited number of languages.  Yet the process through which the 
integration of markets within countries and internationally promotes the disappearance of the 
small languages does not draw particular attention of economists (Grin (1992) is a notable 
exception). Inter alia, the treatment of language as a medium of communication, or as a strict 
means to an end, suggests no reason why a single world language should not suffice. If lan-
guages are mere “communication technologies” (Church and King (1993)), there is no obvious 
reason why a person would value a variety of languages as such.  
 However, if we consider language as a source of stimulation and pleasures rather than a 
mere device, then explaining why a variety of languages would be better than one ceases to be 
a problem.2 In fact, language diversity as such, and not simply language in any one tongue, 
accounts for many pleasurable aspects of life – not only for people with broad linguistic skills. 
Monolinguals can read foreign-language works in translation; they can see and hear foreign 
films and television programs with sub-titles and dubbing. Over and above, much of the variety 
in world cultures from which we all benefit, going beyond the popular arts and entertainments 
but extending to cuisine, styles of manufactures, architecture, decors and dress, is probably 
related to language. Everyday observation suggests that a common language tends to narrow 
cultural differences.  
To be sure, the variety coming from multiple languages can be carried too far for peo-
ple's tastes. Heterogeneity of cultures, manners and speech, especially at home, can even pose 
a threat. Most people probably find cultural variety pleasurable only within limits. But the 
world dimension of the issue is important. There is a big difference between multiplicity of 
cultures and languages in the immediate neighborhood, in a different part of the country, and in 
                                               
2 Compare van Parijs (2011) who relies instead on a normative issue of justice.  
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the rest of the world. The local element can be intrusive and impossible to avoid. But as re-
gards diversity in distant lands, one can pick and choose. The foreign diversity can be tasted 
through travel or imported in selective packaging. To many minds, of course, this is insisting 
on the obvious. Thus, after evoking favorably the prospect of a future where every newborn on 
earth will learn English in infancy, the linguist Crystal adds: "If it [English] is by then the only 
language left to be learned, it will have been the greatest intellectual disaster that the planet has 
ever known" (1997, p. 140).  
But neither questions of communication nor taste for variety come to grips with a fun-
damental aspect of the topic: the intensity of popular attachments to native languages. There 
are numerous movements in favor of minority languages in the world. Efforts to explain these 
movements with strict reference to issues of communication and diversity are futile.  Indeed, 
we even encounter attempts to bring back languages from the grave, as in the case of Irish, 
Welsh, and Basque, and (for a successful example in Israel) Hebrew. People clearly associate 
their maternal language with their culture, and they often experience the rapid decline of this 
language with veritable dismay. As Bisin and Verdier (2011) emphasize, ethnic diversity within 
countries has been more resilient than it was predicted to be a few decades ago. Notwithstand-
ing, even when younger generations continue to identify themselves with a minority culture, 
they often abandon the minority language. 
Thus, the task, I believe, is to propose a general model that will encompass trade and 
social benefits of a common language, a preference for a variety of languages, the fundamental 
role of translators, an emotional attachment to native language, and the threat that globaliza-
tion poses to the vast majority of languages. As regards the first 2 aims, the road is reasonably 
paved; on the last 3, less so. With respect to the aim relating to emotional attachment, the 
model I propose will consider minorities to suffer losses from the subordinate status of their 
language, in opposition to Lazear (1999) who considers cultural assimilation as a possible ben-
efit. I will also discuss this important conflict. In addition, as is common among ethnolinguists 
(see, in addition to the previous references to Krauss, Dalby, and Lewis and Simons, Fishman 
(1997)), I will treat the threat to minority language as coming from the failure of the parents in 
the minority to transmit their maternal language (durably) to their children. The tendency of 
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minority parents to learn the majority language contributes heavily to the problem (as Lazear 
agrees).   
 The next section will present the general framework; the subsequent one will discuss 
the decision choices; the third one will examine the welfare implications; the fourth will evoke 
the issue of the preservation of a variety of languages in a general discussion of language poli-
cy and the future; and the last will conclude.   
     I. The model 
 I will begin with a world economy with a single language, and subsequently, modify the 
analysis to admit two languages, one of which dominates the other. At this next point, I will no 
longer assume a closed economy but an open one which includes numerous languages abroad. 
The open economy aspect will remain sketchy. But I prefer thinking of an open economy that 
can benefit from foreign languages through imports and travel once a second language enters 
at home.  In general, the linguistic issues will not be related to choices of goods but instead the 
allocation of time. In addition, they will concern the sense of “being at home” or general com-
fort or discomfort in the country.  
Let us assume a world where each household produces a single good but desires a large 
variety of goods in consumption, so trade between the households is very important. The trad-
ing also requires communication: talking, writing and reading. Each household divides its time 
between work and leisure and divides its leisure time between pleasurable and non-pleasurable 
activities. I will interpret the non-pleasurable leisure time as including trading, which is, of 
course, not fully correct. The households all have identical tastes. They also all possess a single 
production technology. There is only a single language for the moment, and I will assume that 
the transaction technology, like the production technology, is the same for everyone. Conse-
quently, all households divide their time the same way between the three activities. However, 
as the single difference between them at this stage, they produce different goods. What they 
produce depends on who they are. Individuals specialize in producing different goods.  They 
also divide into groups (industries) of equal size that produce individual goods and the mem-
bers of which are essentially clones. For this reason, I index nothing except the individual 
household’s output and output price.  
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The equations follow. The production function is  
(1)  qi = αH       
where H is the fraction of time spent on working, α is a production parameter, and q is the 
amount produced by household i. The individual household's budget restraint is:  
(2)  ∑= =
T
1k kkii cpqp  
where T is the number of goods that the individual consumes in amounts ck. T is also the total 
number of goods in the economy. There are T−1 relative prices pk of the T goods in terms of 
the production good i, and pi is identically equal to 1. The utility function of the household is 
separable in goods and pleasurable time and takes the specific form: 
(3)  








−−+






∑=
=
S)H(1βcUU
1/ρT
1k
ρ
k       ( ) ( ) 0U0U <•′′>•′       0 < ρ < 1 
where ρ and β are taste parameters, and S is the percentage of time spent trading (the only 
non-pleasurable leisure activity thus far). ρ is a parameter reflecting the individual’s preference 
for variety. On the other hand, β refers to valuation of the pleasurable part of leisure time 1 −  
H − S. In addition, the transactions technology is  
(4)  S = δ (T−1)  
where δ is the fraction of time required to convert good i into a different good k through trade. 
The idea is that widening consumption between different goods requires some extra search and 
time. δ is necessarily a tiny fraction of S since T is assumed to be large.  
Since all production functions are the same and they all exhibit constant costs, the rela-
tive pk prices of all goods will obviously be 1. Given the symmetric way in which all of the 
goods enter the utility function, the ck quantities of consumption will also all be equal. Thus, 
equations (2) and (3) reduce to  
(2a) Tcqi=    
and 
(3a)  ( )S)H(1βcTUU 1/ρ −−+=   
The solution to the consumer's problem yields H, S, qi, and c.   
* * * * 
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Let us next allow for two separate cultures, each of which possesses a separate lan-
guage. There are N1 households which belong to the majority culture, N2 which belong to the 
minority culture, with N equal N1 + N2 and N1 much larger than N2. All households consist of 
2 parents and 2 children. The adults of both cultures either already know the second language 
or decide whether to learn it. I shall use the notation N11 and N22 to designate the adult mem-
bers of N1 and N2 who are monolingual, and N12 and N21 those of N1 and N2, respectively, who 
are bilingual. Henceforth all of the N notation will refer strictly to adults.  
 The revised model will introduce 8 basic differences, 7 of which depend on language 
alone and the 8th (the 5th in order of presentation) on the opening up of the economy. First, 
there will be an income penalty for ignorance of the majority language. The evidence on this 
point is overwhelming (See, for example, McManus, Gould and Welch (1983), Chiswick and 
Miller (1995, 2002, 2007), Dustmann and van Soest (2002), and Dustmann and Fabbri 
(2003)). Second, all monolinguals will suffer higher transaction costs. This is a market imper-
fection that will appear as a loss of time spent shopping. Third, non-shopping leisure time will 
be less satisfying to all monolinguals because they can no longer communicate with every one 
they meet. These first 3 differences yield a fourth one: monolinguals may decide to devote time 
to learning the other language. This will be supposed to be another non-pleasurable leisure 
activity. Fifth, consumption will be more varied for all households because of production op-
portunities abroad and therefore imports. That is, the total number of available goods T will 
rise. Sixth, linguistic variety will contribute to T and do so partly through home production and 
partly through imports. This is the response to Crystal’s alarm that a single language would be 
the “greatest intellectual disaster that the planet has ever known.” The last two differences, the 
seventh and eighth, reflect people’s emotional attachment to their native language but are de-
fined far more broadly. Seventh, there is a general loss of welfare because of not feeling “at 
home” in the minority, which may afflict the majority too if there is a large enough minority 
presence, though it is always less important than for the minority. Eighth, one of the pleasura-
ble activities to which members of the minority may decide to devote some leisure time as op-
posed to other pleasurable activities is to transmit their language and culture to their children.  
 As a basic simplification, I will assume that people limit themselves to learning a single 
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second language, which is the other one spoken at home even though there are very many lan-
guages abroad. As a further simplification, I will also assume that the required extra time spent 
on international transactions because of third languages in the rest of the world is exogenously 
given and does not affect the decision about learning the other home language. However, I will 
relax both of these assumptions in two separate appendices, where neither assumption will 
emerge as fundamental in the analysis.  
The indices i and j will now serve to distinguish between households that are members 
of N1 and N2, respectively. Eqs. (5)-(7) replace the earlier production function, eq. (1).  
(5)  qi = αH            
(6) qj = ηjαH    



<<∈
∈
=
1η0whereNjifη
Njif1
η)7(
22
21
j    
Accordingly, all households are no longer equally productive. Instead, the monolinguals in the 
minority, N22, obtain a fraction 1 – η  less output per hour of labor than the rest.  
Eqs. (8)-(9) replace the earlier eq. (2).  
(8)       ∑= =i
T
1k kikii cpqp  
∑= =j
T
1k kjkjj cpqp)9(     
T and ck acquire new i and j indices because of the lower income of the monolingual minority 
households but for other reasons as well, as will become clear below.  
Next, eqs. (10)-(11) replace eq. (4) for S, the non-pleasurable time people spend out-
side of work.  
(10)  1γ0andXor0XwhereX1)(Tδ)γ(1S iiiiiii <<<=+−+=   
(11) 1γ0andXXXor0XwhereX1)δ(T)γ(1S jjijjjjjj <<<>=+−+=       
ji X,X = the amount of time S any household i or j requires in order to learn the language of 
the opposite culture at home. 
Two new factors affect S in (10)-(11). One is ,X the time monolinguals require to learn the 
second language if they decide to do so.  This required time differs for the two languages. Sel-
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ten and Pool (1991) make the same distinction on the ground of the inherent differences in the 
difficulty of learning different languages (see also the interesting early paper by Marschak 
(1965)). My reason for the distinction differs. I wish to recognize the fact that learning a lan-
guage is always easier if the language prevails in the environment. The prevalence of a lan-
guage means continuous practice and reinforcement. As a result, I assume ji XX > , with some 
consequences later on.  
The other new element of S is the added time people need to spend on transactions be-
cause of language. It is reflected in γ, which I model as follows.  






>∈




+
∈
=
1ψwhereNiif
N
N
γγ
Niifγ
 γ(12)
11
ψ
22
1io
12o
i    






>∈




+
∈
=
1ψwhereNjif
N
N
γγ
Njif         γ
 γ(13)
22
ψ
11
1jo
21o
j  
According to this formulation, the extra time needed for transactions because of language in-
cludes a γo element affecting everyone and an additional γ1 element concerning monolinguals 
only.  The γo element comes from foreign trade. For the moment, this will be interpreted to 
mean either that neither home language is spoken abroad or else that any difference in S for 
people resulting from foreign speakers of either language is negligible. However, I will lift this 
assumption in Appendix 1 and allow, for example, that if Russian is one of the two home lan-
guages, then households may profit from a larger reduction in S from learning Russian because 
of foreign Russian speakers. The change will be modest. The γ1 term in S in eqs. (12) and (13) 
results from ignorance of the second home language and differs for the 2 monolingual groups. 
As regards N11, it depends on the size of N22 relative to the total population N while in the 
case of N22, it depends on the size of N11 relative to N. Evidently, therefore, the problem is 
more severe for N22. However, this problem is mitigated for both monolingual groups by the 
parameter ψ (since ψ > 1 and N11/N and N22/N are both < 1), which refers to the reduction in 
the needed time for transactions stemming from interpreters and translations.  This parameter 
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permits both monolingual groups to get along more easily with a single language.3 By indexing 
the parameter γ1 in eqs. (12) and (13), I intend to signify differences among individual mono-
linguals in overcoming language barriers.  I will always place indices i and j to the left instead 
of to the right of coefficients, as I do here, in order to signify differences between individual 
households in the relevant language group. 
 Next, eqs. (14)-(15) replace eq. (3): 
1 < ω   0 and 1 < ρ  < 0)SH(1)ω1(βcUθU(14) iii
1/ρ
iT
1k
ρ
kiii <≤







−−−+






∑=
=
 
  1ω0 andYˆor  0 = Y whereYY)SH(1 )ω1(βcUθU(15) jjjj
1/ρ
jT
1k
ρ
kjjj <<≤







Ω+−−−−+








∑=
=
Yˆ  = the amount of time S a minority household must set aside to inculcate its language in its 
 children.  
There are a number of new features of these utility functions that call for discussion. 
The factor ω reflects the reduced ability of monolinguals to enjoy personal interactions 
with others in their leisure time. It is modeled as follows: 
(16)      






∈
∈
=
11
22
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i
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ω
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(17)      
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j
Njif
N
N
ω
Njif0
ω   
In this case, I assume that personal interaction is essential and interpreters and translation are 
of no help. However, the relative sizes of the two language groups play the same role as before 
in eqs. (12)-(13) concerning γ. I also assume that the parameter ω1 in (16)-(17) is small so as 
                                               
3 I do not assume any difference in ψ depending on which of the two languages is the source and which is the 
target in a translation. In addition, I disregard the fact that any monolingual party to a trade might have a pref-
erence about translation one way or the other. I also overlook a fundamental complication concerning cultural 
goods: namely, that the goods themselves typically differ to one degree or another between the original-
language and the translated version (as evident in the continuous flow of new translations of the classics of 
literature into the same target languages as before). There is a limited economic literature on these aspects. See, 
for example, Ginsburgh et al (2011).  I ignore all these matters.   
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not to exaggerate the problem since the relevant reduction in welfare concerns only one of 
many possible allocations of pleasurable leisure time 1 – H – S. By indexing ω1 (like γ1) the 
model admits differences in household decisions to learn the opposite language for reasons of 
personal interaction (as opposed to reasons of market efficiency).   
There are important precedents for many of the previous aspects of the specification. 
Breton and Mieszkowski (1977) and Carr (1985) were the first to treat differences in language 
as impediments to trade. In their innovative contribution, Breton and Mieszkowski essentially 
drew an analogy between the role of language in trade and that of transportation costs, while 
Carr (in a French translation of a lost English original predating Breton and Mieszkowski) in-
troduced the similar analogy with regard to multiple currencies. Breton and Mieszkowski im-
plicitly recognize the external effects of the adoption of a language. However, a full develop-
ment of the external effects of a common language awaited Church and King (1993). The latter 
also referred to communication in general rather than specifically to trade. Lazear (1999) took 
the subsequent (and arguable) step of assigning the externalities strictly to benefits in trade. He 
supposes random encounters between traders which consummate in trades when people with a 
common language meet but not otherwise. My proposed framework differs on this point. The 
issue of externalities occurs here in the same way as Church and King (1993) formulated it in 
the case of 1 – H – S, or with respect to social encounters, but only in an attenuated fashion as 
concerns S, with regard to which interpreters and translations intervene. Evidently trade occurs 
massively between people who could never speak to one another directly. However, it’s hard 
to enjoy the company of others with whom one cannot speak. This point will recur.  
We may now spell out the differences in T resulting from openness of the economy and 
a single language. Eqs. (18) and (19) model T as follows: 
(18)      ( ) 1τ0and2or1Lwhere)1(Lτ1Lτ
N
NmτTT 3iii3iW2i21ioi <<<=−+




 ++=  
(19)      ( ) 1τ0and2or1Lwhere)1(Lτ1Lτ
N
N
τTT 3jjj3jW2j11joj <<<=−+




 ++=   
m =  the proportion of N2 households who speak the minority language and equal 1 
Lw =  linguistic diversity in the world. 
Li, Lj = the language repertoire of household i or j.  
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The exogenous element To in these two equations is independent of linguistic variety 
but is still higher than T in the earlier single-language model because of imports.  The other 
influences on T in eqs. (18)-(19) are endogenous and all depend on language.  The first of 
these influences, the τ1 term, relates to the impact of the ethnic composition at home and re-
flects the new consumption goods resulting from ethnic variety, for example, ethnic restau-
rants.  The second of these influences, the τ2 term, relates to world linguistic variety LW and 
reflects the new goods available through import and travel. (The detailed measure of LW is an 
issue and will be postponed.) Obviously these first 2 terms derive from cultural variety and not 
strictly language. However, they are positively correlated with language, and since the part that 
interests us is the one that depends on language, I have eliminated the rest. Accordingly, I sup-
pose that the τ1 term depends strictly on the percentage of minority members N2 who speak 
the minority language in eq. (18) and the percentage of the majority members N1 who speak 
the majority language in eq. (19). Both percentages now equal 1. However, in the next period, 
some minority members will no longer speak the minority language. Therefore, I enter the per-
centage of N2 who speak the minority language as a separate variable, m, in eq. (18) in antici-
pation of discussion of the future. As this implies, there is a future in the model since it is one 
of overlapping generations, even though the decision-makers do not take it into account. Im-
plicitly, the adults only consider the welfare of their children within their lifetime. The term 
associated with τ3 in eqs. (18)-(19) refers to the language repertoire L of the individual house-
hold. This last term enters in the equation in such a way that a move to bilingualism (from L=1 
to L=2) will raise the variety of consumption by a set percentage rather than a set amount (as is 
true in the case of the τ1 and τ2 terms).  
There is a fundamental reason for regarding all linguistic factors in eqs. (18)-(19) as 
beneficial to the individual: namely, that they concern budget allocations that the household 
can choose at will (to visit abroad or to stay home, to read translated works or not to read 
them, etc.). Indexing the coefficients associated with the linguistic variables allows for separate 
household responses to all of them.  
The precedent for the treatment of a variety of languages as a pleasure in the model is 
13 
 
Grin and Vaillancourt (1997).4 The only deviation from them I would stress is the idea that the 
benefit extends to monolinguals as well. According to my proposal, the disappearance of all the 
languages that a household does not understand would hurt every single household in some 
regard.  
θ in the utility functions (14) and (15) refers to the sense of feeling "at home." It is neg-
atively affected by discomfort in the society or a sense of estrangement afflicting all members 
of the minority and possibly afflicting people in the majority too. θ is independent of income 
and the allocation of income or time. I define it as follows.   
(20)       θi = 0.5θθ0and
N
N
θ
N
N
θ1 2i1i222i21i ≤+≤−−  
(21)       1θθ0where
N
N
θθ1θ 1jj21jjj <−<+−=
  
Accordingly, in the case of the majority (eq. (20)), there is not even necessarily any es-
trangement at all: θ1 + θ2 may be zero and thus θ equal to 1. However, as N2/N rises, the het-
erogeneity of cultures and manners at home become less pleasurable, and as indicated in the 
introduction, beyond a certain point, even arouses discomfort. Thus, above a threshold of cul-
tural diversity, low for some, high for others, the members of the majority will be invaded with 
the same feeling of not being "at home" as the one that prevails (more or less strongly) in the 
minority. In addition, according to the formulation, a rise in the proportion of minority mem-
bers who do not speak the majority language, N22/N, if anything, raises discomfort in the ma-
jority.  
As regards the minority, eq. (21), θ is always less than one since θ  is positive. θ  de-
pends essentially on the hospitality in the host country: the ease of obtaining citizenship, social 
attitudes toward foreigners, the ability to use a foreign language in pedestrian traffic and 
transport, the courts and the hospitals, etc. But, in any event, minority members suffer a utility 
                                               
4 Apart from Church and King, there have been a few notable theoretical contributions in the main tradition of 
treating multiple languages essentially as a problem. See, in particular, Sabourin (1985) (who sees a matching 
problem in the labor market depending on one’s favored linguistic environment), Lang (1986) (who poses the 
issue of Beckerian discrimination by employers between groups of workers who simply speak the same lan-
guage differently), John and Ki (1997) (who are clearly sympathetic to the introduction of consumption benefits 
of multiple languages and are also concerned with world issues) and Tamura (2001) (who focuses on the role of 
translation). Lang (1993) provides a nice general review and extension of his basic argument that problems of 
communication help to understand Beckerian discrimination in the labor market. 
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loss.  Quite significantly, however, this utility loss is tempered by a greater sense of solidarity 
within the sub-culture itself. Lazear (1999) offers corroborating evidence from the US. The 
solidarity in the minority has been modeled here as depending strictly on the size of N2/N.5  
To complete the discussion of the utility function, the term Ω, affecting the utility a mi-
nority household gets from transmitting the minority language, needs to be modeled.  
YˆYchoosewhohouseholdsNofpercentagethen
mn
N
N1)θ1(χΩ)22(
2
2
22
jjj
==






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This last equation, (22), is particularly important. The children of the minority learn the 
majority language automatically as a result of schooling and the linguistic environment where 
they grow up. This puts the minority language at a great disadvantage. Because of the impact 
of the majority culture on the children, if the parents wish to ingrain their culture and their na-
tive language so well in their children that the children will remain bilingual throughout their 
adult lives, the parents must make a special effort. To do so, they must allocate Yˆ  of their 
leisure time to the endeavor (see eq. (15)).  I interpret Yˆ  as a set amount of time, just as I in-
terpret X  (the time needed to learn the opposite language). Those assumptions are obvious 
simplifications. Eq. (22) then models the pleasure resulting from this last allocation of time as a 
function of three variables. One is the percentage of the minority who do not speak the majori-
ty language N22/N2. Monolingualism in the minority promotes the parents’ ability to transmit 
their native language to their children and makes the effort to do so more pleasurable for them. 
Another positive influence is θ , the previous measure of inhospitality. Low hospitality (high 
θ ) diminishes the integration of the minority households in the society and thereby increases 
their attachment to their culture and their desire to transmit their culture and their language to 
their children. This agrees with many observations (for example, the impact of the reduction in 
anti-Semitism (the reduction in θ  concerning Jews) in Europe since World War II on the de-
cline of the Yiddish language in the Jewish population of Yiddish-speaking ancestry still living 
in Europe). The third influence is the percentage n of the N2 households who choose to allo-
                                               
5 Note the associated restriction in eqs. (20) and (21) that θi can never be below 0.5 for any individual but θj 
can be close to zero. 
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cate the time Yˆ to the effort. This percentage provides positive social reinforcement to the 
parental effort and increases both its pleasure and its effectiveness. m (currently = 1) enters in a 
crucial way in eq. (22) (where m=0 leads to Ω=0) on the idea that only parents who speak the 
minority language can transmit it to their children. Last, the indexing of the coefficient χ admits 
differences in the pleasure that individual minority parents get from allocating time Yˆ to the 
effort.  
The dependent variable of eq. (22), Ω, is perhaps the single most important reflection in 
the model of the minority households’ attachment to their maternal language. While I assume 
that spending time X means acquiring the opposite language, I will not insist below on the 
necessary success of the object of time Yˆ . There are some basic affinities between eq. (22) and 
the general theoretical specification of the transmission of cultural traits to children in Bisin and 
Verdier (2001).  
Two observations about this model are essential before moving on. First, labor time, H, 
still indicates a common number of hours (fraction of time) for everyone as it did earlier with a 
single language. However, whereas before this treatment of H had been consistent with view-
ing the variable as endogenous, this is no longer true since if given the choice, households 
would now make different labor/leisure choices based on linguistic considerations. Thus, the 
required associated assumption now is that H is exogenous. Next, it is no longer possible to 
eliminate prices as simply as before. Marginal costs will now differ between industries depend-
ing upon whether monolinguals in the minority culture are present or not, and therefore the 
relative prices of all goods may no longer be the same. For this reason, I will add the special 
assumption that minority households are present in all industries along with majority house-
holds. As a result, marginal costs will continue to be the same in all industries, all relative pric-
es will also still be the same and identically one and they will still drop out from the household 
budget restraint, or eqs. (8) and (9). 
As a result of these assumptions, eqs. (8)-(9) and (14)-(15) may be rewritten as fol-
lows, in accordance with the earlier passage from eqs. (2)-(3) to (2a)-(3a): 
(8a)    qi = Tici 
(9a)    qj = Tjcj   
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II. Individual decision problems and solutions 
The decision problem differs by culture and by language group within each culture. For 
households N12, there is no decision problem at all. The model sets all endogenous values on 
the right hand side of the utility function (14a) and the equation simply yields utility U. Quite 
specifically, eqs. (5), (8a) and (18) determine q, c and T, and eqs. (10), (12), (16) and (20) 
determine S, γ, ω, and θ. In the case of a household N11, there is a utility-maximization prob-
lem: whether to learn the minority language or not (the value of X). Eq. (14a) is needed to 
determine X. Otherwise, the system is the same as for the bilinguals in the majority. For any 
bilingual minority household N21, the decision problem instead is Y:  whether to allot the nec-
essary time to inculcating the minority language in its children. Eqs. (6), (7), (9a) and (19) de-
termine η, q, c and T, while eqs. (11), (13), (15a), (17), (21) and (22) determine S, γ, ω, θ, Ω 
and Y.  The monolingual minority households N22 have 2 problems: whether to learn the ma-
jority language and whether to inculcate the minority language in their children. Based on the 
model, however, the former decision, about X, does not depend on the latter and therefore can 
be discussed independently and first. In the case of this first decision, eqs. (6), (7), (9a), (11), 
(13), (15a), (17), (19) and (21) determine η, q, c, S, γ, ω, T, θ, and X simultaneously. As re-
gards the second decision, about Y, the same equations yield the same solutions for η, q, c, S, 
γ, ω, T and θ given X, but the system also solves for Ω and Y after adding eq. (22). The N22 
households who opt to become bilingual simply have less leisure time available to choose 
Y= Yˆ than the rest.    
Let us next consider the solutions themselves and begin with those about learning the 
second language for the two sets of monolinguals. In doing so, it is useful to proceed in stages: 
first to consider the solutions strictly on the basis of the communicative benefits; next to admit 
the benefits of higher variety of consumption; and last, as concerns the minority parents, to 
admit the income effect. We shall subsequently examine the separate problem for the minority 
parents whether to spend the required time transmitting the minority language to their children. 
Suppose we start with the monolingual majority household. After using eq. (10) to 
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eliminate S and eq. (12) to substitute for γi and eq. (16) to substitute for ωi, the (1 ̶ ω)(1 ̶  H  ̶  
S) term in the utility function, eq. (14a), becomes 
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However, if the household acquires the minority language, the required time Xi to learn lowers 
S (eq. (10)) while γi drops and ωi vanishes (eqs. (12) and (16)). The (1 ̶ ω)(1 ̶  H  ̶  S) term is 
instead 
 (24) 1 ̶  H  ̶  (1 + γo) δ (Ti   ̶  1)  ̶   iX  
For the household to benefit from learning the second language, (24) must exceed (23). Thus, 
the household will learn the minority language if 
(25) 
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(The chosen inequality sign assumes that the household decides to learn the language in case of 
a tie.) Correspondingly, the minority household learns the majority language if
 
(26) 
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The first or γ term on the right of eqs. (25)-(26) refers to the time that the household saves on 
transactions by learning the other language. The second or ω term refers to the leisure-time 
equivalent (based on the specification) of the benefit that the household gains from the ability 
to interact socially with the N22/N or the N11/N part of the population, as the case may be, 
during the pleasurable leisure time available at the start (the term in square brackets). Ti and Tj 
in these equations refer to the starting values of both terms, or those prior to learning. 
It is interesting to compare eqs. (25)-(26) with the results of previous efforts to formal-
ize the welfare improvements of language learning outside the labor market, beginning with 
Selten and Pool (1991), continuing with Church and King (1993), and going on more recently 
with Gabszewicz et al. (2011). In all these writings, the incentive to learn the second language 
is much higher for the minority than the majority precisely for the same reason as it is here: 
namely, that the monolingual majority population N11 is larger than the monolingual minority 
population N22. (The first γ1 term on the right evidently dominates the second, ω1γ1, one with 
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the opposite sign.) The difference here is that the communicative benefits stemming from lower 
transactions costs can be driven down, possibly to insignificance, by translation (via the coeffi-
cient ψ which enters exponentially). However, translation cannot similarly diminish the benefits 
of bilingualism stemming from social interactions. Notwithstanding, we remain in the realm 
where bilingualism in both cultures is sheer waste. The next step repairs this problem.  
 Suppose next we admit the impact of a second language in widening the variety of 
goods that enter in the consumption basket. L rises from 1 to 2 in eqs. (18)-(19), causing T to 
go up by the percentage τ3.There is now an extra benefit from learning the second language 
associated with T in eqs. (14a)-(15a). After substituting  (0)γi  for 
ψ
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The new τ3 term on the right has 2 parts. The first one, containing c, reflects the essential wel-
fare gain of the wider variety of consumption (eqs. (14a)-(15a)). The second one, containing 
γo, with the opposite, negative sign, is a second-order effect reflecting the extra time required 
to shop for the new goods that the second language makes available (see eqs. (10)-(13)). (δT 
in the negative part is a small fraction while T in the positive part is a large number.) Both Ti 
and Tj in these 2 equations continue to refer to initial values prior to learning. Since both 
goods and leisure now enter the analysis, the welfare weight β for leisure relative to goods 
comes into play.
 
To complete the analysis, we must include the benefit of the rise in income that a mi-
nority household obtains by learning the majority language. If the monolingual minority house-
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hold learns the majority language, qj rises from η qj to qj (eqs. (6)-(7)) and therefore by 1 ̶ η . 
Tj is independently given by eq. (19). Therefore, the rise in qj translates into a rise in cj (eq. 
(9a)). The household simply consumes a fraction 1 ̶ η  more of each and every good. This 
leads to eq. (29)
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where the last term reflects the utility value of the added consumption. Eqs. (27) and (29) pose 
the full conditions for learning the opposite language for the two sets of monolinguals.  
 There remains the minority decision whether or not to accord the required time to in-
culcating the native language in its children as opposed to devoting the time to other pleasura-
ble pursuits, sports, socializing, reading, and other parental activities, etc. For the minority 
households who are already bilingual, N21, the formal decision rule is exactly the same as for 
the members of N22 who decide to become bilingual, even though the former households have 
more time left over for other pleasurable pursuits besides Yˆ . From eqs. (15a), (17) and (22), 
the solution is to adopt Yˆ if   
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As for the minority households who decide to stay monolingual, the same equations say that 
the rule is to adopt Yˆ if 
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This last sub-group of N22 is therefore more prone to adopt Yˆ than the former N22 sub-group. 
Their alternative uses of leisure time are less satisfying: they have fewer opportunities for satis-
fying encounters in everyday life.     
III. Social welfare implications  
Some parameters differ by individual household and therefore not all households in the 
same culture and language group (N12, N11, N21, or N22) will make the same decision, and a 
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closed form solution to the system is not possible without more assumptions about the distri-
bution of the relevant parameters. However, as the model stands, we can see that the decen-
tralized solutions to both of the language problems are inefficient. Four separate inefficiencies 
may be distinguished. There is a basic social dilemma, however, because repairing the fourth 
inefficiency, if not the third, runs contrary to the problem of repairing the first two.  
First, any learning of the majority language by the minority to gain communicative ben-
efits as such is socially inefficient. Learning of the majority language by the minority would 
yield a greater social advantage. Every unit addition to N21 produces communicative benefits 
to N11 individuals while every unit addition to N12 yields such benefits to only N22 individuals. 
Notwithstanding, some members of N11 may decide to learn the minority language for the sake 
of the communicative benefits alone (eq. (27)). Two factors mitigate this problem while a third 
one can work either way. The first mitigating factor is translation. Translation cuts down the 
numbers in the majority who decide to learn the minority language for the sake of the trade 
benefits (that is, in connection with the γ term, not the ω term in eq. (27)). The second attenu-
ating factor is that the members of the majority who learn the minority language still obtain 
benefits of consumption diversity that they would otherwise not get (the τ3 term in eq. (27)). 
Indeed, some of these people might have decided to learn the minority language regardless of 
any communicative benefits (if τ3 was high enough).  The one factor that could go either way 
is the greater required time to learn the minority language than the majority one: iX  > jX . So 
far as this greater difficulty cuts down the numbers who try to learn the minority language, the 
factor attenuates the social problem. So far as the majority members nevertheless decide to 
learn the minority language on account of the communicative benefits, the social waste is larg-
er. (More resources are lost as compared with the opposite learning of the majority language 
by the minority.) Obviously the issue is one of an elasticity.  
Quite independently, however, as a second inefficiency, there is too little learning of the 
majority language by the minority. That is, even if no N11 members decided to learn the minori-
ty language, there would still be too few minority households who decided to learn the majori-
ty language, and this is so for two separate reasons. First, as we see from eq. (29), the minority 
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disregards the communicative benefits of a reduction in N22/N to the majority.6 Second, as we 
also see from this equation, the minority also disregards the comfort in everyday life that the 
majority gets from lower N22/N (the θ2 term in eq. (20) for θ in the utility function eq. (14a)). 
Once again, two factors mitigate the problem. One is the income benefit of learning the majori-
ty language. This benefit clearly promotes learning of the language by the minority. The second 
is the special ease of learning the majority language because of its currency in the environment 
(in this case, there is no issue of an elasticity: any learning of the majority language helps). On 
the other hand, translation increases the problem.  Because of translation, fewer minority 
households will learn the majority language. While this does not reduce the majority’s trade 
benefits, it still cuts down the group’s communicative benefits in social interactions and the 
group’s general sense of being “at home”.  
The third inefficiency relates to the failure of the decentralized decision-making to take 
any account of linguistic diversity in the world LW. This world diversity increases everyone’s 
welfare by increasing diversity of consumption (see eqs. (18)-(19) together with (14a)-(15a)). 
But while the presence of the minority language makes everyone better off in this respect,    no 
household gives this a thought in its decision-making. True, depending on how we interpret LW 
(a point to which we will return), no resulting inefficiency will ensue as long as the minority 
language thrives elsewhere in the world. If French does not survive in Canada as a minority 
language, LW might remain the same (depending on how we define it). However, in the case of 
any language without majority status anywhere (or in the sort of circumstances that we cur-
rently suppose and from which we will only depart in Appendix 1), the social inefficiency is 
evident.  
The fourth inefficiency comes from the disregard of the future (which in the present 
case means the time after the current generation of adults is gone). This disregard is now total, 
but any element of it will do. The result is an inadequate concern with the benefit of encourag-
ing bilingualism in the children of the minority. According to the model, this bilingualism (rais-
ing L to 2 in eq. (19) and thus maintaining m equal or close to 1 in eq. (18)) can do nothing but 
                                               
6 Of course, the majority similarly disregards the welfare benefits to the minority of its learning of the minority 
language. But this last disregard only helps at this stage of the analysis since it reduces the social misallocation 
resulting from the first inefficiency.   
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good to the next generation by enhancing consumption diversity for minority and majority 
alike. Yet this inefficiency stands in stark conflict with the first two, which say that more bilin-
gualism among the adults in the minority is a benefit. The point is, of course, that any added 
bilingualism in the minority will damage the transmission of the minority language to the mi-
nority’s children. We must pause here on a difference in viewpoint in Lazear (1999). 
In a rich discussion covering much of the same terrain, but in some important regards, 
especially immigration and the concentration of minorities in parts of urban areas (“ghettoes”), 
covering much more, Lazear treats the welfare benefit of the transmission of the minority lan-
guage to the next generation as an open question. Some background is important. For most of 
his discussion, Lazear supposes a highly hospitable country tending to integrate minorities over 
time in conformity with the American ideal of the “melting pot.” From this perspective, he rea-
sonably considers that the factor of estrangement affecting all members of the minority culture 
in the model θ , if present, could disappear over time and instead of working on transmitting 
their culture to their children, which may be to the immigrant parents’ own advantage (a point 
on which the model agrees), the parents would perhaps do their children more good by trying 
to rid them of their sense of estrangement in the country and eliminating θ  (see p. 122 in par-
ticular).   
This part of Lazear’s stand could be easily accommodated (surely as a possibility) 
without upsetting anything in the model by modeling θ  accordingly. However, some other 
differences cannot be reconciled. One of them concerns the learning of the majority language 
by the children of the minority. Whereas I assume that the children of the minority will learn 
the majority language automatically and the only question is whether they will become bilingual 
and retain the parents’ native language, Lazear treats the children’s entire language repertoire 
as essentially dependent on the parents. With regard to this difference, I believe that the gen-
eral sociolinguistic literature favors my assumption, at least in a skeletal model about language.  
In addition, Lazear tends to minimize the advantage of the children’s retention of the minority 
language both to themselves and to others, which I stress. On this next point, it bears note that 
ordinary humans are notoriously capable of learning several languages in childhood while stud-
ies of the impact of bilingualism on wages, and even more specifically on the income effect of 
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possessing minority languages point, if anything, to a benefit of dual languages on wages.7  
To return to the social inefficiencies in the model, there could be a fifth one relating to 
the minority’s transmission of its language and culture to its children, and apart from any issue 
of the future. But the argument in this case is a bit precarious. Imagine that in deciding whether 
to choose Yˆ  minority households supposed that few others or no others in their own culture 
would make the same choice. Then too few of the minority households would adopt the choice 
from the standpoint of the collective welfare of the minority. However, if the minority is small 
enough and highly enough concentrated in urban areas (as Lazear reminds us), the assumption 
of an underestimate of n is questionable. Notwithstanding, there is clearly a coordination prob-
lem in the minority, as the model is formulated, stemming from the role of n in the transmission 
decision (eqs. (30) and (31)). Those minority households for which χ (eq. (22)) is not high 
enough would not wish to be drawn into any collective efforts to promote n that some others 
in their culture would wish, since those efforts would require excessive personal contributions 
to special schools, churches, political organizations, newspapers, for example. Yet these peo-
ple’s withdrawal from the collective effort would reduce the rewards that the rest can obtain.8 
These observations are meant to reflect some aspects of reality. We do, in fact, encounter or-
ganized efforts of minorities in the world to bolster their culture and language by imposing 
restrictions within their own ranks. But those efforts are also the subject of tensions within the 
                                               
7 See Ginsburgh and Prieto-Rodriguez (2011) in a major study of 9 European countries and Grin (1999) regard-
ing Switzerland. True, U.S. evidence shows no wage advantage of possessing the principal minority language 
at home. However, it does not show any wage penalty from it either.  See Fry and Lowell (2003). Likewise, in 
Quebec bilingual native speakers of the minority language, English in this case, earn no more than the mono-
lingual French (though the bilingual French do earn more from possessing English). See Vaillancourt (1996). 
(Compare also more recent results by Christofides and Swidinsky (2010).) The only study I know that may 
mean that retention of a minority language, as such, is a wage liability is Chiswick et al (2000), relating to 
Bolivia, where knowledge of an Amerindian language together with Spanish damages earnings. According to 
the authors, this result could come from social discrimination against indigenous language speakers, which 
would indeed make a case against the language. However, the authors also consider that it could come from a 
poor command of Spanish or lower schooling or a combination of all three; the evidence will not permit saying. 
8 In such a context, one could also easily imagine a “free rider” problem. To elaborate, suppose, in an extension 
of the model, that the required time Yˆ to obtain the benefit of bilingualism for one’s own children would drop 
for the individual as n rose as the collective effort paid off, and yet the collective engagement calls for a mini-
mal amount of time Yˆ .  Then there might be households who would make the engagement but following the 
commitment would prefer to “free ride” and choose lower Yˆ  than agreed. Compare Laitin (1993).  
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minority.9 
IV. General observations on policy, language survival and world linguistic diversity 
The model harbors 4 parameters that could serve as instruments for language policy: 
θ , ψ, iX and jX . θ  depends on the facility of obtaining citizenship, permits for places of wor-
ship, immigration policy, and attitudes toward the minority language in public places, including 
hospitals, transportation, and the courts. It is also affected by many factors relating to ψ, in-
cluding status as an official language, school curricula and legal requirements about languages 
in broadcasting, labelling and advertising. Finally,  iX  and jX  depend partly on public pro-
grams of adult education or at least may be said to depend so even though the programs may 
not affect the required time for learning since the programs clearly alter the cost of learning 
and thereby affect iX  and jX  (which represent non-pleasurable leisure time) in utility-
equivalent terms.  
In addition, the fundamental ambiguity in the model about the proper use of the tools of 
language policy to encourage or discourage the minority language resonates well with reality. 
Different countries make different choices. There are numerous instances of outright hostility 
to minority languages, such as Kurdish in Turkey and Iraq, Hungarian in Romania. There are 
also instances of countries that try to ignore the minority language(s) at home and implicitly 
hope they will disappear. Thus, France denies recognition of Breton, Corsican, Basque and 
Alsatian (the largest and essentially a dialect of German) as official languages, even regionally. 
Yet some countries go the opposite way and try to accommodate their main minority lan-
guage(s). Witness the efforts of the Swiss to sustain Romansh, the Swedes to help the Tor-
nelaan, the Dutch to preserve Frisian. The European Union generally takes a favorable attitude 
toward minority languages. Despite political debate in the US about according official status to 
Spanish, it is difficult to miss the basic accommodation of Spanish in everyday life in the coun-
try. (See the detailed discussion of France and the US in Kibbee (n.d.).) 
The manifest difficulty of achieving the objectives of language policy also finds clear 
expression in the model.  In particular, hospitality to minority cultures, while possibly intended 
to keep the cultures alive, will tend to accelerate assimilation by the young and thereby under-
                                               
9 In this regard, Lazear makes the important point that the presence of large urban centers in which a minority 
language flourishes will affect the kind of immigrants a country attracts. 
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mine the minority language. If this is contrary to policy, the efforts to increase θ toward 1 and 
eliminate θ  completely will need to be offset by an effort to raise χ (eq. (22)) and make it easi-
er and more satisfying for the minority to assure the durable transmission of their native lan-
guage to their children. In the end, though, empirical evidence suggests that the language poli-
cy may not have the desired effect.  The Irish have encountered problems in efforts to keep the 
Irish language alive in isolated pockets of its existence. At the opposite end of the pole, out-
right hostility to minority languages, as in the case of Hungarian in Romania or Kurdish in 
Turkey, may increase solidarity in the minority and its will to hang on to language and culture. 
A general model of language should harbor such salient aspects of reality.   
As regards the future, the model clearly reflects the threat to minority languages that 
was announced at the beginning. The minority language in our model is in danger. Unless steps 
are taken to avoid it, a portion of the minority members, N2/N, will no longer possess the mi-
nority language in the next generation, and the proportion of those who do possess it, m (cur-
rently = 1), may be expected to drop towards n. Short of immigration, which has not been 
modeled, there will be no monolinguals at home who possess strictly the minority language in 
the next generation. The only monolinguals will be those who speak the majority language 
alone. Moreover, those people will include members of the N2 population, around (1–n) N2 of 
them. Since this last group of monolinguals in N2 can hardly transmit the minority language to 
its children, the choice of allocating Yˆ time to the effort befalls strictly the other N2 members 
and only will be made by those who find    
0β n)m1()θ1(χ jj ≥−++  
(as follows by setting N22 equal to zero in eq. (30)). Note also that in this last inequality m is 
now less than 1 while n is a maximum of m. On this reasoning, knowledge of the minority lan-
guage in the N2 population could fall precipitously in the generation after the next.10 Clearly, 
according to this specification, the minority language could vanish from the home country 
within a few generations.  
By extension, the only languages in the world that are safe from extinction are those 
                                               
10This is not to deny that the remaining monolingual N2 population might retain a strong sense of separate 
cultural identity. This qualification is important in connection with Olivier et al (2008) who effectively model 
the interesting possibility that following the vanishing of N22 ethnic diversity would survive and remain steady. 
It would be an impoverished ethnic diversity all the same. (I italicize “effectively” because the authors do not 
refer to language as such.)  
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with a national home base. With around 200 countries worldwide that makes around 200 safe 
languages at most. If we compare this view with reality, 200 is an exaggeration in one respect 
and an understatement in another. It is an exaggeration because some languages, like English 
and Arabic, have a home base in several countries. It is an understatement because some lan-
guages are firmly rooted in regions of countries: Punjabi in Punjab, Catalan in Catalonia, Kurd-
ish in Eastern Turkey and Western Iraq, etc. On a rough estimate, the understatement is prob-
ably more important.11 Indeed, a fundamental preserver of minority languages in the world may 
well be economic and political fractionalization (and warfare) within countries and domestic 
labor and capital immobility, all of which make the model less applicable. Yet if we expect fu-
ture economic growth and advance of world trade to feed the disappearance of regional barri-
ers to internal trade, the model will become progressively more applicable and it becomes diffi-
cult to envisage even as many as 400 languages in a couple of centuries. 
From this perspective, the preservation of world linguistic diversity, LW, enters as a 
fundamental consideration. On this issue, few people will see harm in the effort to preserve 
outside of their own country on earth, and some people will be strongly in favor. However, 
there is an issue of international coordination. Short of international agreement, there is no 
mechanism relating the number of surviving languages in the world to the desired number of 
languages. In the case of animals and plants, where a similar situation holds, some international 
actions have been taken to protect endangered species.12 But with the possible exception of the 
EU, no similar movement is afoot in the case of languages. Suppose, for the sake of argument, 
that such a movement was warranted. What general guidelines could it adopt?  
In any attempt to safeguard the number of world languages, some system of priorities 
would be needed. Weinstein's (1992) analysis of an ordering on the grounds of diversity, which 
he essentially defined in connection with the evolution of species of animals and plants though 
he mentions languages too, would suggest strictly philological considerations. The concern 
                                               
11In addition, a few countries, like Switzerland, provide adequate public support at the national level for several 
regional languages. There may also be a few lingua franca in the world like Swahili in parts of East Africa or 
Malay in parts of Southeast Asia whose safety does not depend on status as a majority language in any particu-
lar country or region.  
12 World linguistic diversity and world biodiversity are distinct in many ways (see Kibbee (2003)). Therefore, 
let me emphasize that I intend no other analogy between the two besides the fact that both of them imply exter-
nal effects that can only be internalized through international action.  
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would be with keeping alive as many higher branches as possible in the evolution of language. 
Thus, a language like Basque, whose origins are clouded in mystery, would remain highly im-
portant, while Catalan, a close cousin of Castilian and French, all Latin derivatives, would be 
much less so. Similarly, preserving one of the Gaelic languages would matter a great deal, but 
if Gaelic Welsh survived, keeping Breton alive as well would be of little concern, especially as 
opposed to preserving another genus. But literary specialists would be very much concerned 
with a different criterion: the presence of a literature in the language. In this event, the argu-
ment for Catalan would be much stronger than the one for Basque. In addition, if we consider 
the criterion as requiring a certain literary capital going beyond folk tales, only a fraction of the 
world's languages would matter.  
Quite significantly, however, the issue may be broader. Do we really want a measure of 
LW that depends strictly on the surviving languages in the solution to a resource-constrained 
allocation problem? Suppose, for example, that a radical form of bilingual diglossia sets in on 
earth with a single language serving in speech and writing in government, business, trade and 
literature, while all other languages survive strictly in informal contact with kinsmen. Would 
there be no reduction in LW? The worried accounts of the spread of English as a universal lan-
guage envisage a certain tendency in this direction. In addition, the history of previous spreads 
of languages over broad territories since antiquity suggest grounds for such concern (Dalby 
(2002) and Da Landa (2011), chapter 3, are particularly interesting).13 My fundamental point, 
however, is simply that the vibrancy of languages is probably an issue as well as their survival 
in measuring LW. Therefore we may want a measure of LW that incorporates welfare weights 
for surviving languages in a Weinstein type of analysis. 
V. Closing remarks 
                                               
13 Many optimistic views of a universal language envisage a stable situation with multiple languages and vi-
brant bilingualism most everywhere on earth. The nineteenth-century inventor of Esperanto, Zamenhof, a na-
tive of Bialystok, Poland who was inspired by the hostile relations he encountered between Polish-speakers, 
German-speakers, Russian-speakers and Yiddish-speakers, certainly belongs to this mould.  However, Dalby 
notably suggests the instability of such situations in the past. He also shows clearly that this instability stemmed 
from internal forces even though the spread of a common language in the relevant examples, including ancient 
Greek and Latin, never covered more than a modest fraction of the world by any relevant measure and preceded 
the internet and mass communications.   
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This has been an exercise in fitting pieces together. There exists an impressive range of 
contributions to the economics of language by economists working in different sub-disciplines. 
Quite understandably, in their attempts to develop some aspect of this vast topic, authors have 
tended to abstract from much of the rest. My concern instead has been to unify and bring to-
gether.14  As a result, my proposed framework is more complicated than some though I have 
tried to keep it as simple as possible. Two choices loom large in my efforts to simplify. First, I 
adopted conditions where language has no relative price effects at all. Second, while admitting 
the effect of language on both the variety of consumption and pleasurable leisure time, I as-
sumed that variety of consumption and pleasurable leisure time enter separately in the utility 
function. Without both modeling choices, I could not cope. 
                                               
14 The one important area of contributions to the study of multiple languages by economists (the biblical prob-
lem of Babel) that I am aware of having ignored entirely relates to the costs of multiple languages within inter-
national organizations like the United Nations and the European Union. The outstanding contribution with 
clear application on this subject though of broader application as well, is Pool (1991), who demonstrated the 
existence of a theoretical solution to the problem of reconciling fairness and efficiency in language manage-
ment in any multi-group population operating under a single set of political rules and therefore in these organi-
zations.   
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APPENDIX 1 
Foreign speakers of the two home languages 
Suppose we lift the assumption that neither home language is spoken abroad or the 
equivalent assumption that any difference in transactions time S resulting from foreign speakers 
of either language is negligible. There is now less transaction time required for trade with for-
eigners. Accordingly, let us replace eqs. (12) and (13) with: 
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γW,o is associated with the transaction time in foreign trade that affects everyone because of 
third languages. ψW,22ioW, )λ(Nγ
−+  and ψW,11joW, )λ(Nγ
−+ − alternatively, W,1i γ  and W,1jγ  
− are associated with the transactions time in foreign trade affecting the monolinguals only. 
W,1i γ  and W,1jγ  are higher than γW,o but still lower than γo. The difference γW,1 − γW,o differs 
for the two monolingual populations. For N11, the difference depends positively on the total 
world number of foreign speakers of the minority language who do not understand the majority 
one, NW,22, while for N22, it depends positively on the total world number of foreign speakers 
of the majority language who do not understand the minority one, NW,11.  For both groups, it 
depends negatively on translation (as indicated by the exponent –ψ).15  
 
The new language learning solutions corresponding to eqs. (27) and (29) be-
come:
                                               
15 I assume that the λ coefficient is properly adapted to make it possible to write the relationship of γW,1 − γW,o 
to NW,22 or NW,11 and ψ as simply as I do. 
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There are two important changes. The first concerns the added economies in transactions costs 
from learning the second language and is in the first term on the right. The second concerns the 
greater leisure time available for pleasurable encounters and is in the second or ω term on the 
right (as reflected in the lower value of (0)γˆ  than the previous γ(0) ). In addition, but as a less-
er consideration, the τ3 term on the right is somewhat higher than before because the rise in T 
requires less transactions time than before ( oW,γ is lower than oγ ).   
According to the proposed modification, there will be more learning of the home lan-
guages by both sets of monolinguals because of foreign speakers of the languages, but transla-
tion will limit the part of this rise associated with trade. As regards the extra learning, the entire 
part resulting in more household pairs (worldwide) that are now capable of communicating in 
two separate languages will be a social waste from the standpoint of communication alone. 
However, some of this new social waste will no longer be reparable nationally and poses a 
problem of international coordination. Moreover, if the minority language at home is larger 
than the majority one on the world level (and this is reflected in trade, as implicitly the case), 
from an international perspective, the new social waste may mean too much learning of the 
majority language by the minority rather than the opposite. However, from the national per-
spective, which remains perhaps the more important one, so far as foreign trade yields any ad-
ditional learning of the majority language by the minority it will obviously diminish the problem 
of inadequate learning of the majority language at home. For this reason, this last problem of 
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inadequate learning of the majority language becomes smaller, for example, for a country like 
England than one like Italy.  By the same token, however, the problem of the insufficient 
transmission of the minority language to the children becomes larger in a country like England 
than one like Italy.  
Of course, this view of the modifications of the earlier analysis abstracts from the pos-
sibility that people will wish to learn the second home language for the sake of communicative 
benefits of social interaction with tourists or during visits abroad (which is not in the ω term16 
though it could be added) (compare Olivier et al (2008)). In addition, the analysis is likely to 
remind us of the underlying assumption that there is no obstacle to trade except language. 
None of the other familiar obstacles to trade − distance, contiguity, etc. − are present. In this 
connection, we should keep in mind that any introduction of the other obstacles to trade would 
no longer permit us to drop all relative prices as equal and would therefore complicate every-
thing from the start. (Compare the pioneering analysis of language in foreign trade in Breton 
and Mieszkowski (1977), who keep the other obstacles to trade in the analysis and center in-
stead on the impact of language on the terms of trade.) The most obvious result of any move in 
this direction would be to limit foreign trade relative to domestic trade and thereby to limit the 
importance of the modifications in this appendix. 
                                               
16 Since the term remains associated strictly with N22/N or N11/N.  
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APPENDIX 2 
Learning of a foreign language 
Suppose next we admit the possible decision to learn a foreign language for the sake of 
benefits of lower costs of foreign trade. Specifically, let the relevant foreign language be the 
most important one for the country in foreign trade. For bilinguals this means admitting the 
possible learning of a third language while for monolinguals it means a new choice of a second 
language. To simplify, I will now revert to the assumption (lifted in the previous appendix) that 
the two home languages are only spoken at home. It is obviously reasonable to think of the 
third language as English.  
Eqs. (10) and (11) regarding time S remain the same except that X must now cover the 
cost of the time of learning the third language, 3X . I will assume that the time required to learn 
this language is the same as that of learning the minority one for everyone at home, while the 
time required to learn the majority language is still smaller than that of learning either of the 
other two for the same reasons as before, or in other words, 3X = ji XX > . Evidently the 
language repertoire L that affects the total number of goods in the consumer basket in eqs. 
(18) and (19) may now equal 3. The fundamental changes come in eqs. (12) and (13) and con-
cern the coefficient γ. Suppose now: 
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Since all foreign trade still takes place in foreign languages, the time spent on foreign transac-
tions because of language is reflected in γo as before. However, γo breaks up in two parts, one 
associated with foreign languages other than the third one, γW,3, and the rest, associated with 
the third language γo − γW,3 (see eqs. (32) and (33)). This last part is a positive function of the 
total world number of speakers of the third language NW,3 and a negative function of transla-
tion or ψ (ψ > 1). In addition, the monolinguals N11 and N22 still bear the same linguistic cost 
as before of trading in home goods unless they learn the second home language, which is mod-
eled precisely as before as a positive function of N22/N or N11/N, as the case may be, and a 
negative function of translation (see the γ1 term in eqs. (12c) and (13c)). 
The solutions to the learning problems for the two home languages are still eqs. (27) 
and (29), which are repeated for convenience: 
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The solutions to the new problem of learning the foreign language differ some for monolin-
guals and bilinguals. These solutions are:
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Bilinguals N12 rest their decision about learning the foreign language strictly on eq. (27a) while 
bilinguals N21 rest theirs on eq. (29a). However, both sets of monolinguals will have a choice 
to make between learning one language or the other in case learning either one would be an 
advantage. To make this choice, monolinguals N11 will need to choose based on the higher of 
the two right hand sides of eqs. (27) and (27b) (since iX = 3X on the left), while  monolinguals 
N22 will need to make the same choice on the basis of the higher of the two differences be-
tween the right hand and the left hand sides of eqs. (29) and (29b) (since the two left hand 
sides differ).   
According to this formulation, if the number of third-language speakers, NW,3, is im-
portant, there could be learning of the third language by the majority despite the fact that it 
does not yield any social benefits of communication outside of trade (except via tourism, which 
I have ignored though this can be repaired). The same holds true for the minority. However, in 
the minority’s case, both the special facility of learning the majority home language ( jX < 3X ) 
and the income bonus of learning it, load the dice  in favor of learning the home language. Any 
tendency of the minority to learn the foreign language nevertheless would make the majority 
less happy.  On the other hand, this choice by the minority would promote the transmission of 
the minority language to the next generation since the danger to this transmission comes strict-
ly from the majority language, as the model is formulated. On this reasoning, the spread of 
English (and foreign languages in general) for the sake of the benefits in foreign trade, helps to 
preserve minority languages. Yet the reasoning may be questioned from the broader perspec-
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tive of Section IV where the worldwide applicability of the model was put in doubt and the 
possibility was raised that the spread of common languages, whether they be native or foreign, 
would contribute to the breakdown of internal barriers to domestic trade and make the model 
more applicable.  On this alternative view, by promoting market integration at home, the adop-
tion of a foreign language reduces the protection of regional languages against the corrosive 
winds of the competition with the majority language. The issue is open.  
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